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Abstract
Most recent work on Boards of Directors has been focused on what can be considered
best practices for effective governance in terms of roles, composition, process and style.
Furthermore, this literature can be divided among very practically oriented managerial work,
and more rigorous, theoretically based work. Most of the empirical research in this area has been
centered on Anglo-Saxon countries. Some European countries, like Spain, have a very different
governance tradition. Given this context, our present work pursues three complementary
objectives: 1. To ascertain the current status of governance practices in Spain. 2. To obtain
evidence about which of these practices may be associated with effective governance. 3. To find
out what factors account for the composition of General Managers’ compensation.GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS FOR EFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP:
THE CASE OF SPAIN
Introduction
Most recent work on Boards of Directors has been focused on what can be
considered best practices for effective governance. These practices correspond to:
1) The role of the Board as a governance body (strategy, control, development of
the top management team,...). For representative work on this, see Zahra
(1990), Donaldson (1995), Johnson, Hoskinsson and Hitt (1993), Daily (1996)
or Parker (1996);
2)  Elements of the Board's composition (such as the number of directors, the
number of independent directors, the number of executive directors, dual
leadership,...). Here, the relevant literature is very extensive; for instance, Daily
and Dalton (1994), Zahra and Pearce (1989), Baysinger and Hoskinsson (1990)
or Hill (1995);
3)  Characteristics of the Board (such as background of directors, gender, minorities,
diversity,...), as in Provan (1980), Kosnik (1987) or Molz (1988); and
4)  Process and style of the Board (committees, number of meetings, length of
meetings, information sent before meetings,...) as in Kesner (1988), Meuter
(1995) or Lear (1995).
However, to associate any of these elements to better company performance has not
been an easy task. For instance, the effect of Board size on performance has been studied by
Pfeffer (1973), Provan (1980) and Zahra and Stanton (1988). The effect of insider/outsider
composition has been studied by Vance (1964), Schmidt (1975), Schmidt (1977), Kesner (1987),
Chaganti et al. (1985), Cochran, Wood and Jones (1985), Kesner, Victor and Lamont (1986),
Baysinger and Butler (1985), Pearce and Zahra (1992), Daily and Johnson (1997), and Zahra
and Stanton (1988). Some of this work finds a positive relationship, some no significance, and
some a negative relationship. The effect of the Board's characteristics on performance has been
studied by Vance (1978), Pearce (1983) and Norburn (1986). Structure and performance are
related in Rechner and Dalton (1991); and process and performance are studied in Miller and
Norburn (1986) and in Zahra and Pearce (1987). In a recent meta-analytical review (Dalton et
al., 1998), the authors conclude that there is no meaningful relationship between Board
composition or Board leadership structure and financial performance.
Furthermore, the literature can be divided between very practically oriented
managerial work, usually based on the real experience of people on Boards (Vander Weyer,
1995; Park, 1995; Kesner and Johnson, 1990; Useem et al., 1993; and Lorsch and MacIver,1989), and more rigorous, theoretically based work, usually very unrelated to real practice,
and with most of the empirical research in this area centered in Anglo-Saxon countries (like
most of the studies quoted above). Some European countries, like Spain, have a very different
governance tradition less centered on the stock system and institutional investors, making it
very difficult to generalize results from other countries. Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) show
that institutional differences across countries matter.
Given this context, our present work pursues three complementary objectives:
1.  To ascertain the current status of governance practices in Spain.
2.  To obtain evidence about which of these practices may be associated with
effective governance.
3.  To find out what factors account for the composition of General Managers’
compensation.
To achieve these objectives, we designed and mailed a questionnaire to more than
5000 large and medium-sized firms in Spain. We selected all firms with more than 150
employees or sales revenues (in 1995) exceeding 3000 million pesetas. We received 498
answers from a variety of sizes and types of companies in different industries. Most of the
questionnaires were answered directly by the company's President or CEO. The sample is
very representative of Spanish companies, covering about 3.7% of the Spanish workforce and
selling all together more than 10 trillion pesetas.
The questionnaire covered a wide range of issues from general data to the
composition, style and characteristics of the Board of Directors and Executive Committee,
the tasks and roles of each governance body, including the CEO, organizational structure, and
appraisal and compensation of the Top Management Team.
This paper covers the three objectives stated above in the following way:
1. First, we present some descriptive statistics that show and analyze the
current situation of governance practices in Spain. In general, the governance
practices used in Spain are less advanced than those described in most Anglo-Saxon
studies. Structures are less sophisticated, many Boards are still not very active, and
even the active ones do not meet very often, nor do they receive enough information.
2. The study reveals that the Board of Directors' activity on its own is not
directly associated with more effective governance. When a powerful Board of
Directors is combined with a powerful CEO, one finds the Board attribute usually
associated with good governance practices, as in Pearce and Zahra (1991). However,
the link between these practices and greater profitability cannot be confirmed.
3. We also study the effect of different governance elements and practices with
regard to executive appraisal and compensation, specially CEO compensation.
Appraisal and compensation practices in Spain are not very sophisticated. We study
the composition of CEO compensation (behavior-based vs. results-based) in depth
and look at how it is affected by the following factors:
2– The monitoring role of the Board of Directors as measured by its level of
activity.
– The Board of Directors' composition as measured by the number of
independent Board members.
– The discretion of the CEO and the measurability of results, as measured by the
industry, the type of organizational structure, and stock market listing.
– Risk considerations, as measured by company size and type of ownership
(family business, State-owned enterprise or other).
Finally, we study the relationship between the composition of the CEO's
compensation and the company's financial performance.
This study is unique both because of the nature and size of the sample used and also
because it is the first comprehensive study of governance practices in Spain.
The questionnaire and the sample 
The information needed to carry out the research was obtained by means of a
questionnaire (reproduced in Appendix 1). This questionnaire was sent to a total of 5,565
companies. 498 companies answered it, giving a response rate of 9%.
The survey was sent to large and medium-sized companies. Specifically, the
universe was obtained from the Dun & Bradstreet database, taking the 5,565 companies that
had billed more than 3,000 million pesetas in 1995 or that had more than 150 employees in
that year (or that met both criteria simultaneously).
The 498 companies that answered the questionnaire had a combined sales turnover
of 10.1 trillion pesetas and a total of 444,948 employees (3.7% of the Spanish workforce in
1995). Therefore, it is probably the largest sample ever obtained for the purpose of
researching governance practices in Spain.
Some cautions are necessary about the questionnaire. The questionnaire was sent
either to the Chairman or to the CEO. Thus, although only one person filled in the
questionnaire, his/her position can be considered high enough to give him/her an overall view
of the company. As we can see in Table 2.1, this is the case in our sample. Fourteen percent
of those who answered were Chairman of the Board of Directors, 55% were CEOs, and only
in 13% of the cases did another manager answer the questionnaire.
3Table 2.1 Who answered the questionnaire?
With respect to the questionnaire's contents, at the time of compiling the quantitative
data, it was observed that there had been confusion in some cases between operating
companies and groups. In addition, the results were requested with reference to only one
year. This meant that the data do not give the complete picture. Any governance practice
takes time to produce results. An earlier governance practice may continue to influence
results today. Similarly, a current practice will affect results in the future. Consequently, it is
unwise to relate governance practices and results in the same period. Also, given the data
requested in the survey, we can only calculate profitability using the Profits/Sales ratio.
We have classified the data for analysis in three ways:
1)  Type of ownership, depending on whether the company is a Family business, a
State-owned enterprise, a Subsidiary of a foreign multinational, or a Non-
family-owned Spanish company, which we have called "Non-family". The
person who answered the questionnaire self-classified his/her company.
2)  Type of structure, which can be functional, divisional or matrix/network.
3)  Size by number of employees or sales.
We analyzed the relationship between size and type of ownership, and between
size and organizational structure. The purpose of this was to assure the sample's validity
(Table 2.2). It can be seen that the State-owned and Family companies are smaller than the
other types. By type of structure, the functional companies are smallest.
Table 2.2 Relationship between size and type of ownership and structure
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* In million pesetas
** Numbers in bold indicate significant results (p < 0.05)
Type of ownership
Multinational State-owned Family Non-family
Sales * 22,205.30 10,988.3 11,867.2 18,096.30
Type of structure
Functional Divisional Matrix
Employees 481.9 992.7 1,077.70
11,912.60 20,642.60 24,518.60 Sales *
Employees 1,050.29 565.81 1,384.32 765.94
AveragesWe checked for differences in profitability and productivity according to the above
typology (structure, ownership and size). We used the Profit/Sales ratio as an indicator of
profitability. The average for the total sample is 6.35%, with a standard deviation of 6.4%.
We found no statistically significant differences, as can be seen in Table 2.3.
Table 2.3 Profitability by Type of Ownership
Another of the ratios studied is the Sales Turnover/Employee as an indicator of
productivity. The overall average is 45.9 million pesetas per employee. We looked for
significant differences based on type of ownership, type of structure, and size. The only
statistically significant difference we found (Table 2.4) is that average sales per employee in
the Family businesses was 30.8 million, whereas in Non-family and Multinational companies
it was over 51 million.
As a possible explanation of this result, it should be remembered that, at the present
time, most Family businesses are still located in labor-intensive industries. This result
confirms that while Family businesses are following the trend in Europe of increasing sales
per employee, they are still some years behind.
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94 106 24 133
0.0635 0.06669 0.0581 0.0873 0.0604
0.06415 0.07 0.06162 0.0967 0.0512
0.04467 -0.08852 0.2456 -0.06134
Sales (in mill PTAs / Employee
Type of Ownership
Number of companies 158 33 120 133 444
Average 51.3 46.4 30.8 53.0 45.9
Standard deviation 5.5 14.9 2.7 6.5 3.1
z -0.85 -0.03 3.64 -0.98
p < 0.05
Multinational State-owned Family Non-family TotalGovernance practices in Spain
From the data in the questionnaire, taking into account the representativeness of the
sample, we were able to draw a clear picture of governance practices in Spain. In this section,
we present a summary of the descriptive data. First, we present data on Boards of Directors.
Second, on Executive Committees. Third, on the CEO. And fourth, a balanced account of all
three governance bodies.
Board of Directors
A key question concerns the Board's level of "activity". Specifically, we asked whether
the companies have an active Board or whether they do not have a Board at all; whether the
Board has been formed purely to meet legal requirements and is not active; or whether it is only
nominal and has no influence. We have aggregated the latter three alternatives under the label
"non-active".
Table 3.1 (a) presents the data on the level of activity. It is interesting to see that,
overall, 42% of the companies have non-active Boards. We found significant differences
depending on the type of ownership and structure. Before analyzing these differences,
however, we studied how some of the Board's characteristics depended on the level of
activity. Table 3.1 (b) shows the significant differences.
First, we see that size has a significant effect on the level of activity, and yet the
average size of non-active Boards is very large. Second, we see some composition differences.
Active Boards are larger, with both more insiders and more outsiders, but with a larger ratio of
outsiders to the total (59% vs. 52%). Third, with regard to process, active Boards meet more
often (8.2 times vs. 3.7) and for a longer overall time (26.7 vs. 13.3 hours a year). However, no
significant differences in terms of profitability have been identified.
Finally, when looking for differences in structure, we find that the percentage of
active Boards of Directors is above average in the companies with a divisional structure, and
below average in the companies with a functional structure. The reason for this could be that
companies adopt a divisional structure when they reach a large size and operate in a wide
variety of businesses. In these circumstances, a significant decision dynamic is generated that
usually requires a greater degree of Board activity. On the other hand, the higher percentage of
passive Boards of Directors among the functional companies may be due to the family
businesses, which have a higher concentration in this type of structure.
Table 3.1 (a) Level of Board activity
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Level of Board
Activity Type of Ownership* Type of Structure**
Multinational State-owned Family Non-family Functional Divisional Matrix
Active 58% 42% 72% 51% 78% 37% 48% 15%
Non-Active 42% 58% 28% 49% 22% 48% 35% 17%
* p < 0.0001
** 7 2
2
= 0.01 ; p < 0.01Table 3.1 (b) Different characteristics according to level of Board activity
As we said before, there is a higher percentage of active Boards of Directors among
the non-family (78%) and State-owned (72%) companies, than among the family (51%) and
multinational (42%) firms. One explanation for this may be the influence of the directors'
"sense of ownership" and "freedom". Indeed, a multinational company that operates in Spain
establishes itself legally as a company, but usually its operations are not governed by the
Spanish company’s Board of Directors, i.e. the Board exists to meet legal requirements (legal
Board) or to represent the company to third parties (nominal Board). In this sense, the
directors' freedom is limited by managers and by the parent company's policies.
A similar thing happens in family businesses, specially when they are in their first or
second generation, as is the case with most Spanish family companies. In these companies,
the leader –the company founder or his/her immediate successor– usually has a great deal of
authority over the other members of the Board of Directors, and very often holds a majority
or a very large percentage of the capital. This person's authority and power are used to limit,
directly or indirectly, the other directors' freedom.
At the other extreme, in the non-family companies, directors, in their capacity as
owners or direct representatives of the owners, exercise their rights freely and are motivated
by their sense of ownership because, as owners, they are remunerated according to the
company's performance. In consequence, they exercise their rights in an active Board.
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Differential Active Non-Active
Factor Board Board Statistic
The average number of
employees is higher in 1,256 498 p  < 0.05
companies with active boards
Average sales are higher in
companies with active boards 19,171 15,109 p < 0.05
The number of directors is
higher in active boards 8.6 6.0 p < 0.0001
The number of insiders is
higher in active boards 3.5 2.9 p < 0.05
The number of outsiders is
higher in active boards 5.1 3.1 p < 0.0001
The number of meetings is
higher in active boards 8.2 3.7 p < 0.0001
The number of meeting hours
is higher in active boards 26.7 13.3 p < 0.0001A similar argument can be applied to State-owned companies. Directors are not
owners but are answerable to those who appointed them (usually members of the party in
power). So, they tend to be active on the Board to demonstrate their ability to manage
publicly-owned companies and the ability of the political group they represent.
The different levels of freedom and sense of ownership of the people who make up
the Board help to explain, as shown in Figure 3.1, the degree of Board activity by type of
ownership.
Figure 3.1 Active Boards, freedom and sense of responsibility
Overall, we see that the level of Board activity is very low. This is further confirmed
if one analyzes the amount of time spent in Board meetings, the way this time is spent, and
the information sent to Board members prior to meetings. The conclusion is that even active
Boards are far from effective. This problem is basically related to Board members' sense of
ownership and freedom of decision-making.
Executive Committees
We use the term Executive Committee (EC) to refer to the company's Top
Management Team. While the Board of Directors has a very important governance role, a
Management or Executive Committee is a fundamental integrative and learning instrument in
governing a company.
In our sample, 84% of the companies have an EC. This result implies that there is
still a substantial number of medium and large companies that do not have regular EC
meetings. The proportion increases in the family businesses, 22% of which do not have an
operative EC, and in the State-owned companies, where the figure is 23%. If we compare the
companies that have an EC with those that don't, we find that those without an EC are smaller
and are significantly less profitable (3.7% vs. 5.7%) (Table 3.2).
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(42%)Table 3.2 Executive Committee, size and profitability
We also studied the frequency of meetings. Table 3.3 shows the Executive Committees
broken down according to the total number of hours spent in meetings in one year. We can see
that the distribution frequency of meetings is bimodal. One third meets weekly, whereas another
third meets monthly. This bimodality may indicate a very different use of the EC in either case.
In one case they may actually act as an integrative management committee, while in the other
they may be acting as an effective internal Board of Directors.
Table 3.3 Percentage of Committees according to hours spent in meetings in a year
Finally, the information received by the committee members before meetings is
limited and is strictly functional.
We have seen that although 84% of the companies have Executive Committees,
there are still 16% that do not. In addition, we have seen that the use made of Executive
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Average Percentage of
Average Sales* Profits/Sales* companies
With Executive
Committee 18,707 5.7% 84%
Without Executive
Committee 10,978 3.7% 16%

















32 48 96 192 320
Hours of Committee meetings in a yearCommittees is very different. Therefore, we can conclude that, in Spain, Executive
Committees are not used to their full extent. We have also found a clear link between the use
of an EC and company performance.
CEO
The CEO’s responsibilities in a company are very wide. In this section, we shall
consider these responsibilities in a summarized form. According to Pearson (1985) (1), there
are six areas that constitute the main tasks of a CEO:
1. Shaping the work environment.
2. Crafting a strategic vision.
3. Marshaling resources.
4. Developing star performers.
5. Organizational body building.
6. Managing operations.
While we did not have the necessary data to study the first task, we were able to
study the CEO’s involvement in the other five tasks. 
We used a question listing 14 functions that are sufficiently representative of
governance and management. The respondent had to indicate what role, if any, each
governance body (Board, Committee, CEO) played in each of these functions, choosing
between the following four roles: Approve, Decide, Propose, Inform. The aim was to
ascertain the extent to which each governance body was involved in each task. We have used
the answers to this question to calculate the CEO's degree of "power" and "activity" in five of
the six tasks proposed by Pearson (as listed above). The method used is as follows: first, we
assigned each of the 14 functions to one or other of the five basic tasks of a CEO. Second, we
assumed that a CEO has "power" in a given task when he decides or approves it, and that he
is "active" in a task when he plays any one of the four possible roles (approve, decide,
propose, inform).
Thus, we have been able to study the CEO's influence in the related tasks. We have
calculated the variables shown in Figure 3.2. On the one hand, we can see in the figure that
the CEO’s level of activity is quite high in all the tasks. This result was foreseeable: the CEO
will be involved in most of the firm’s areas.
On the other hand, the CEO’s power has two different tendencies. First, there are
three tasks where the CEO’s power is high: managing operations, organizational body
building, and developing star performers. This is consistent with the fact that these are basic
CEO tasks. In contrast, there are two tasks where the CEO has less power: marshaling
resources, and crafting a strategic vision. This is a clear indication of the increasing role
being played by the Board of Directors in strategic management, a fact confirmed again in
the following section, where this analysis is carried out in greater detail.
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(1) Andrall E. Pearson. “Six Basics for General Managers” HBR, July-August 1989.Figure 3.2. A comparison of basic CEO tasks
The relative power of the three governance bodies
After analyzing the three governance bodies separately, it could be interesting to
study them together. Specifically, through the question already used in the CEO section, our
purpose is to study the "activity" and "power" of each of these bodies in fourteen key
decision areas.
The questionnaire presented 14 functions that are sufficiently representative of
governance and managerial tasks. To ascertain the governance bodies' degree of involvement
in each task and to show who has decision-making power in the different functions, two
indicators were calculated. On the one hand, "% involvement" shows, for each governance
body, the percentage of the sample companies in which that body was said to play one or
more of the four proposed roles; it indicates each governance body's degree of involvement in
each function. In order to determine the decision-making power, the Decide and Approve
answers were combined in a single variable, "% decision", which represents each body's


























0.77Table 3.4 Involvement and decision level of governance bodies
Analysis of these results allows us to affirm that it is normal practice in Spanish
companies for Boards of Directors to play a significant role in strategy decisions (83% decide),
business selection (84%), investment decisions (72%), auditing (65%), defining the financial
structure and sources of finance (60%), and relations with shareholders (59%). The CEO, in
contrast, is particularly strong on basically managerial functions: negotiations with clients and
suppliers (74%), organizational changes (63%), and collective agreements (58%). The CEO has
much the same % of decision as the Board of Directors in the appraisal, recruitment and
compensation of top managers. The role of the Executive Committee emerges as secondary; it




%% % % % %
involvement decision involvement decision involvement decision
1. Company strategy  90 83 90 38 88 38
2.  Business line selection.
Mergers, acquisitions and
divestments 91 84 80 26 81 26
3. Investment  decisions.
Operating budget. 78 72 82 40 87 41
4.  Structure and sources of
finance. 70 60 70 34 83 45
5. Auditing 73 65 56 28 76 38
6.  Assessment of Top
Managers (appraisal) 56 45 51 24 87 59
7.  Selection and separation 
of Top Managers 67 57 52 24 87 55
8.  Compensation of Top
Managers 66 58 46 21 88 54
9. Institutional
relations 55 41 52 28 78 54
10. Organizational changes 49 38 76 43 89 63
11. Collective Agreement 39 26 65 35 82 58
12. Negotiation with clients
and suppliers 26 14 70 46 87 74
13. Relations  with
shareholders 70 59 31 11 59 26
14. Environmental  analysis 56 35 79 32 76 34If we look at "% involvement", we see that the Board of Directors plays a greater role
than the other bodies only in relations with shareholders, strategy decisions, business selection,
and mergers, acquisitions and divestments. It plays a greater role than the Executive Committee
in decisions that affect managers (although it is the CEO who actually makes the decisions in
most cases) and in auditing. These are all indications of the Board of Directors' strategic
(decision) and supervisory (involvement) role.
Perhaps the most noteworthy finding from the above table is the exclusion of the
Board of Directors from some basic decisions. For instance, the "% decision" of the Board of
Directors in the appraisal, recruitment and compensation of top managers is relatively low,
slightly above 50%. And yet, nurturing the development of top executives is one of the Board
of Directors' main responsibilities. The fact that 35% of the Boards of Directors do not decide in
auditing, one of the tasks most stressed by the Cadbury Report, also needs to be highlighted.
Even more important is the fact that 61% of the Boards do not take part in negotiating the
collective agreement, a vital issue in a country like Spain. The Board's involvement and
decision power in organizational issues is also very low.
Table 3.5 shows the "% decision" of the different governance bodies in companies
with active Boards and in companies with non-active Boards.
Table 3.5 Decision level of different governance bodies depending on the Board's activity
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Board of Directors Executive CEO
% decision Committee % decision
% decision
Active Non-active Active Non-active Active Non-active
Boards Boards Boards Boards Boards Boards
1. Company  strategy  91 66 35 43 32 46
2.  Business line selection.
Mergers, acquisitions and
sales 89 74 27 27 24 30
3. Investment  decisions.
Operating budget 79 60 40 40 38 46
4.  Structure and sources of
finance 64 53 33 40 41 52
5. Auditing 67 58 27 28 37 40
6.  Assessment of Top
Managers (appraisal) 50 36 22 27 54 66
7.  Selection and separation of
Top Managers 67 39 23 23 48 64
8.  Compensation of Top
Managers 63 49 19 23 51 58
9. Institutional  relations 48 28 31 28 52 57
10. Organizational changes 44 28 42 43 60 67
11. Collective  Agreement 33 16 34 35 57 62
12.  Negotiation with clients
and suppliers 18 5 47 46 73 74
13. Relations  with
shareholders 63 53 12 11 25 26
14. Environmental  analysis 40 22 32 32 29 41The decision-making power of non-active Boards of Directors is significantly
smaller than that of active Boards. Looking at the other governance bodies, we can see that
the CEO is the one who assumes power when the Board is non-active. Obviously, the causal
relation may be the reverse, i.e. it may be that the Board becomes non-active because a
powerful CEO does not let it act.
We can also see that although active Boards of Directors have greater decision-
making power in all the functions, there are still some functions in which their power remains
very low: auditing, organizational changes, collective agreement, and managing top
managers.
All of this can help to better understand the differences between active and non-
active Boards of Directors. There is a group of activities in which the decrease in decision
power from active to non-active Boards translates into greater decision power for the CEO
(environmental analysis, strategy, appraisal and recruitment of top managers). This means
that in relation to these important decisions, there is a balance of power between the Board
and the CEO. When the Board is less active, the CEO takes on a more prominent role to
compensate for the lack of effective governance.
There is another group of activities (institutional relations, collective agreement,
organizational changes, and negotiations with clients and suppliers) where the decrease in
decision power from active to non-active Boards is not offset by an increase in CEO decision
power. In this case, therefore, given the nature of the decisions concerned, which are much
more to do with management than with governance, one can conclude that some active Boards
may be taking on too many managerial functions (thus interfering with the CEO's role).
Even non-active Boards have very considerable decision power in some of the
functions, specially the strategic ones. There are at least two possible explanations: although
the Board of Directors does not develop all its operating potential, it may be that it vetoes the
CEO’s decisions; alternatively, it may be that the Board of Directors decides or approves
what has in fact already been decided or approved by the CEO or Executive Committee. The
next section may shed additional light on these issues.
Let us look at all of these data in graphic form. Multivariate factorial analysis has
been used. Due to the high correlation of the different governance bodies in many of the
functions, we can represent their behaviors with two factors, which we have plotted on a two-
dimensional plane. The following graphs show the positioning of the governance bodies and
of the functions when the Board of Directors is active (Figure 3.3) and when it is non-active
(Figure 3.4). As an intuitive idea, this technique enables functions that have similar behaviors
to be plotted close together and those that are different to be plotted distant from each other.
14Figure 3.3. Factor analysis for companies with active Boards
Figure 3.4. Factor analysis for companies with non-active Boards
In these graphs we did not plot the "environmental analysis" and "relations with
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–1We can see that there are three groups of functions:
Functions taken on by the Board of Directors, even by non-active Boards. These are
basically strategic decisions, again showing the important role played by the Board in
strategic issues. The functions are:
1. Company  strategy. 
2.  Selection of business lines. Mergers, acquisitions and sales.
3.  Investment decisions. Operating budget.
4.  Establishment of financial structure and sources of financing.
5. Audits.
Functions shared between the Board of Directors and the CEO. These correspond
basically to the task of managing top managers. Here, active Boards play an important role,
while non-active Boards "delegate" to the CEO. One essential difference, therefore, between
active and non-active Boards is their involvement in the development of the top management
team. The functions are:
6.  Assessment of top managers (appraisal).
7.  Separation and selection of top managers.
8.  Compensation of top managers
9. Institutional  relations.
Functions taken on by the CEO. This group comprises the more executive and
managerial decisions, basically made by the CEO, even when there is an active Board. The
functions are:
10. Organizational  changes.
11. Collective  agreement
12.  Negotiations with clients and suppliers.
This tentative analysis shows us how important it is to understand the balance of
power between the CEO and the Board in order to gain an insight into the contribution each
one makes and the role each plays in practice. An analysis of each in isolation is not enough.
We shall therefore explore this balance of power in greater depth in the following section.
The relative power of CEOs and Boards of Directors as a classification scheme
In the previous section, we studied some descriptive characteristics of the different
governance bodies and took a first step towards understanding the relative power of these
bodies. This understanding is vital, specially in view of the overall push, both by academics
and by practitioners, towards a revitalization of the Board of Directors. Many of the
suggestions for reforming corporate Boards are aimed at strengthening the Board's power
relative to that of the CEO.
Pearce and Zahra (1991) studied the Board-CEO relationship using data collected
from Fortune 500 Industrial and Fortune 500 Service corporations. They used the two by two
typology shown in Figure 4.1 below.
16Figure 4.1: Typology of Boards of Directors
Source: Pearce and Zahra (1991)
The characteristics of each of these types of Boards of Directors are as follows:
Caretaker: The main characteristic of this type of Board is the lack of power of both
the CEO and the Board. Here, the Board is normally regarded merely as a legal obligation to
safeguard the shareholders' wealth, and has little real capacity to influence decision-making.
Power in the organization is diluted between the CEO and other top managers. Accordingly,
there is no real governance body.
Statutory: Characterized by a weak Board of Directors and a powerful CEO. The
Board is ineffectual, its sole function being to confirm the chief executive's decisions. Board
members are chosen by the CEO and make little effort to define their role and functions,
confining themselves to ceremonial approvals that legitimize the CEO's power.
Proactive: Characterized by a weak CEO and a powerful Board. Two types can be
distinguished: first, those that work in favor of the company, and second, those that serve
their own interests. This type of Board can normally be transformed into an effective weapon
for activism by shareholders concerned about the company's management or their own
interests. Sometimes, a proactive Board can take on an excessively prominent role in
management, even to the point of replacing the CEO.
Participative: Characterized by a powerful CEO and a powerful Board of Directors.
This type of Board is characterized by a high degree of debate, discussion and even discord
between the CEO and the Board. Leadership of the company is shared. As both have more or
less equal power, most decisions must be taken by consensus; and many vehicles of
negotiation are established, as neither has formal mechanisms to prevail on its own.
Pearce and Zahra (1991) classified the companies in their sample according to the
relative authority of Board and CEO in relation to 15 major types of decisions, ranging from
approving changes in capital structure to selecting the new CEO. They then studied the
differences among these four groups in terms of the characteristics, composition, internal





High Advisory (Vance, 1968) Collegial (Vance, 1968)
Statutory (Aram and Cowen, 1983) Shared Leadership (Hermann, 1987)
Managerial Control (Molz, 1985) Participative (Wood, 1983)
CEO Ratifying (Wood, 1983) Normative/Strategic (Molz, 1985)
Power
Caretaker Proactive
Low Third Party (Hermann, 1987) Proactive (Hermann, 1987)
Review & Approve (Molz, 1985) Strategic/Shareholders' Control (Molz, 1985)organizational performance. They found significant differences among the four types of
Board with regard to characteristics (independence, expertise, involvement), process and
style. The only relevant difference in composition was female representation. Finally,
participative Boards were associated with the highest level of company financial
performance.
These are interesting insights and we used the data obtained from our questionnaire
to replicate this analysis for the Spanish data. We have used a different set of decision
variables (described in the previous section), but it remains close enough to the one used by
Pearce and Zahra. We have used a different set of variables to study characteristics,
compensation, and process and style. These variables are:
Characteristics
Level of activity (active vs. non-active)
Executive Committee (Yes or No)
Who appoints the directors (Board, CEO, shareholders)
Composition
Size of the Board (number of directors on the Board)
Type of directors on the Board (insiders vs. outsiders)
Process and style
Frequency of meetings (number of meetings per year)
Duration of meetings (hours spent in each meeting)
To establish the different types of Boards of Directors, the companies were classified
according to the answers they gave regarding the role of each governance body in the 14 key
functions (question no. 18).
In order to decide to which of the four types (caretaker, statutory, proactive,
participative) the Board of Directors of each company in our sample belonged, we proceeded
as follows. We calculated the power of the CEO and the power of the Board by counting up
the number of functions in which each was said to decide or approve decisions. This gave us
two scores between 0-14. These scores showed, up to a point, the decision power of the
Board of Directors and the CEO in the 14 executive functions. Next, the Board of Directors
or CEO were considered to have a "high" decision power if the number of issues on which
they decided or approved decisions was equal to or greater than 8, and a "low" decision
power if the number was equal to or less than 5. Companies with a value of 6 or 7 were
excluded in order to increase the discriminating power among the resulting groups. This
process made it possible to classify the companies on the basis of the above characteristics
(see Figure 4.2).
18Figure 4.2. Classification of the companies according to CEO and Board decision power
Of the 498 companies in the sample, 280 were classified. The results of the
classification showed the following distribution: 37% of the companies had proactive Boards,
and 23% of the Boards were caretaker. In cases where the CEO had "high" decision power, it
was observed that 25% had statutory Boards, and 15% of the Boards were participative, i.e.
showing a balance of power between Board of Directors and CEO.
Hypotheses
1. Performance
In agreement with Pearce and Zahra (1991) and bearing in mind the limitations of
the performance data in our questionnaire, we propose two hypotheses:
H1. Companies with participative Boards of Directors are more profitable.
H2. Companies with participative Boards of Directors are more productive.
2. Characteristics
In this part we have used three variables relating to Board activity, the existence of
an Executive Committee, and the appointment of new directors. With regard to Board
activity, we can assume that a powerful Board will have a higher level of activity.




















15 %With regard to the existence of an Executive Committee, taking the EC to be a body
that helps govern the company, we may assume that the percentage of companies with an EC
will be greater among companies in which there is a balance between CEO and Board. If
both CEO and Board are powerful, the EC will play a supporting role. And if both CEO and
Board are weak, the EC will play a leading role in governing the company.
H4. The balance of power between CEO and Board tends to strengthen the need for
an Executive Committee.
Firms with statutory Boards are characterized by having a weak Board and a strong
CEO. Therefore:
H5. The percentage of directors appointed by the CEO is higher in companies with
statutory Boards.
3. Composition
Here, we used two variables: size, and percentage of outside directors. We make no
hypothesis about a relationship between size and type of Board, but we do hypothesize a
greater percentage of outsiders in participative Boards, in accordance with Pearce and Zahra
(1991). Therefore:
H6. Participative Boards have a higher percentage of outside directors.
4. Process and Style
Powerful Boards are likely to meet more often and for longer than ineffectual
Boards.
H7. Powerful (participative and proactive) Boards meet more often and for longer.
5. Type of Ownership and Size
We were also interested in studying the distribution of the different types of Boards
in each type of ownership. One might expect to find some regularities that could be of
interest. Finally, we also studied the size of each group of companies. Both can be considered
control variables and may help to account for the results we obtained.
Results
1. Performance
As shown in Table 4.1, we found no statistically significant differences in terms of
profitability. However, average profitability in our sample is slightly higher in companies
with weak CEOs than in companies with strong CEOs.
Nor did we find significant differences in productivity, calculated in terms of sales
per employee. However, the productivity of firms with participative Boards is twice that of
20the other types of firms. In spite of being so large, this difference is not statistically
significant (95%), owing to the high variance of productivity in companies with participative
Boards.
At this point, it is worth recalling one of the objections to the questionnaire raised
earlier: it is not very realistic to measure the profitability or productivity of governance
practices using the results of just one year. All governance practices take time to produce
results. Therefore, it is not surprising that we should have been unable to prove any
relationship between practices and performance, especially considering the way these
practices are changing in Spain.
Table 4.1. Performance and Board typology
2. Characteristics
We can see from Table 4.2 that we can accept hypotheses 3 and 4. The companies with
strong (participative and proactive) Boards do indeed have a higher level of active Boards. We
can also see that in companies where there is a balance of power between the CEO and the
Board (participative and caretaker), the percentage of ECs is higher. Where there is a
participative Board, there is an EC supporting the CEO. In the case of caretaker Boards, where
the CEO and the Board have no power, the EC is the body that really manages the company.























































BD*: Percentage with active Boards (66%)
EC*: Percentage with Executive
Committee (85%)
CEO**: % of members appointed by CEO
**c2
6 = 15.807 ; p= 0.015
*p < 0.05The results of our analysis of the CEO's influence on the appointment of new Board
members show that such appointments are not independent of the type of Board of Directors.
Specifically, the CEO's influence is greater in companies with statutory Boards (30%) than in
the others. This confirms the idea that ineffectual Boards of Directors are made up of people
picked by the most powerful person in the company, be this the Chairman or the CEO. Thus,
hypothesis 5 –which states that the CEO's influence in appointing new Board members will
be greater in companies with statutory Boards of Directors–, can be accepted.
3. Composition
When considering the composition of the Board of Directors, we should study
basically the size of the Board and the number of inside and outside directors. Table 4.3
shows the composition of the different types of Boards in these terms. The most salient
comparison is without doubt that between companies whose CEO has a higher level of power
and those where the CEO has less power. The former are the statutory and participative
Boards. They have a very similar composition: about 65% outsiders and 35% insiders. The
distribution of outsiders and insiders is more even in the other two types of Boards. In
caretaker Boards, the proportion is 50%, while in proactive Boards there is a higher
percentage of outsiders (57%).
Table 4.3. Composition and Board typology 
Proactive Boards are the largest. Participative Boards are the smallest, but they have
the highest proportion of outside directors (66%). The size of the Board may be related to the
size of the company, but it is also true that smaller Boards, with about 7 directors, are very
good for team work and effective governance. When CEOs want ineffectual Boards, they





























ID: Percentage of insider directors
OD: Percentage of outsider directors
ND: Total number of directors on
the Board
p < 0.05The high percentage of outside members in statutory Boards helps us appreciate that
the numbers of outsiders is not related to effective governance (Dalton et al., 1998). We need
to consider other characteristics of the Board.
4. Process and style
As can be seen in Table 4.4, Proactive Boards have more meetings, with an average
of 10 per year. Participative Boards meet 7 times a year, statutory Boards an average of 6
times a year, and caretaker Boards 5.65 times a year (the data show 90% confidence). For a
caretaker Board to "take care" of the company, it is sufficient for it to study the auditors'
report and approve the budget; consequently, 3 or 4 meetings a year are enough.
Statutory Boards are different. The number of times they meet is irrelevant:
ultimately, what the CEO says is what is done. In contrast, Boards that monitor the company
closely (participative and proactive Boards) require more meetings. Thus, we can accept
hypothesis 7.
Table 4.4. Process and style and Board typology 
5. Type of Ownership and Size
We see that companies with participative Boards are smaller (in sales and





























NM: Number of meetings in a year
HM: Duration (in hours) of each
meeting
NY: Total hours spent on meetings in
a year
p < 0.1Table 4.5. Size and Board typology
If we study the relationship between Board typology and type of ownership (Table
4.6), we see a higher percentage of proactive Boards among State-owned and non-family
companies (about 40%). Statutory Boards have a greater presence in State-owned and
multinational companies (about 30%).
Family businesses have a higher percentage of caretaker Boards (28%), although the
percentage of statutory Boards in this type of company is not far behind (26%). This result is
consistent with the model of a first or second-generation family business with a CEO-founder
in the company's management. The percentage of participative Boards is smaller in State-
owned companies (5%) than in the rest.
It is interesting to note that the percentage of powerful (proactive and participative)
Boards is higher in non-family companies (58%) than in the rest. If we look at the percentage
of powerful CEOs (statutory and participative), they account for 47% of multinational firms,
40% of family businesses, 37% of State-owned companies, and 35% of non-family
companies. This greater presence of powerful CEOs in multinational companies can be
understood if we consider that the CEO in a subsidiary company is appointed to lead (we must
remember that in these companies a larger proportion of Boards are formed for purely legal

























S: Total Sales (in mill. PTAS)
NE: Number of employees
p < 0.05Table 4.6. Type of ownership and Board typology
Discussion
Our results are summarized in Table 4.7. Like Pearce and Zahra, we do find some
significant differences among the four groups of Boards. Some differences in Board
characteristics, Board composition and Board process are statistically significant. Also,
companies with participative Boards are different in terms of size, and quite different in
terms of Board attributes. Furthermore, participative Board practices are usually associated
with good practices in the literature.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to prove any significant differences in
performance (in spite of the almost double productivity of companies with participative Boards).
We strongly believe that this lack of any positive association between participative Boards and
performance is due to the high intersectorial variability of our data and the changes currently
taking place in Spain in the area of corporate governance –changes whose effects will only
become apparent in the future. One cannot relate governance practices to results when the
practices are rapidly changing.
However, the differences in the attributes of participative Boards with respect to
other types leads us to subscribe to Pearce and Zahra's view that "CEOs might generally be
well advised to seek ways to share power with directors in an effort to achieve more
favorable financial performance".
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33% 45% 32% 41% 37 %
21% 18% 28% 23% 23 %
16% 5 % 14% 17% 15 %
29% 32% 26% 18% 25 %
100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 %







9= 7.451 ; df : 9 ; p=0.59Table 4.7. Conclusions
The Board's role in managing top managers
In this section, we wish to explore in greater depth one of the fundamental tasks
associated with corporate governance: management appraisal and compensation. We have
already seen that these types of functions are not well covered by Boards in Spain. In this
section, we will study the practices adopted in reality, and their main determinants.
This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, we will describe existing
appraisal practices and compare them with the practices followed in the USA. In the second
part, we will study the determinants of CEO compensation and how it relates to Board practices.
Appraisal
The most traditional and best-known personnel appraisal systems originated in the
United States as a consequence of US legal requirements: a series of lawsuits over
discriminatory work efficiency appraisals generated a body of legislation. In 1978 the United
States Congress approved the Civil Service Reform Act, which established the need for
formal appraisal systems for most federal agencies. In 1992, in a survey of private Fortune
100 companies, it was shown that 95% of them had a formal personnel appraisal system
(Wilson, 1995). In another survey, conducted in 1996 and answered by 756 North American
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Hypothesis Conclusion
Performance H1. Companies  with  participative Boards of Not
Directors are more profitable. proven
H2. Companies  with  participative Boards of Not
Directors are more productive. proven
H3. Strong (proactive  and  participative)  Boards
are more active than weak Boards. Proven
H4.  The balance of power between CEO and
Characteristics Board tends to strengthen the need for an
Executive Committee. Proven
H5.  The percentage of members appointed by the CEO
is higher in statutory Boards. Proven
Composition H6.  Participative Boards have a higher
percentage of outsiders. Proven
Process and H7.  Powerful (participative and proactive) Boards
Style meet more often and for longer. Provenfirms, it was shown that 95% of them had appraisal systems for middle managers and 83%
for senior managers (Bohl, 1996).
The results of our survey reveal that the situation in Spain does not reach these
levels. In the first question in this section, the companies were asked whether they had a
formal appraisal system for their managers. As Table 5.1 shows, only 50% have adopted such
systems. Bearing in mind the size of the companies in our sample (sales above 3,000 million
pesetas and/or more than 150 employees), these results are highly significant: management
appraisal systems are very little used in Spain, particularly if we consider that the practices of
the companies in our sample, given their greater size, are likely to be more advanced than
those of Spanish businesses as a whole.
Upon analyzing the implementation differences for these practices, taking
company ownership, organizational structure, size (sales turnover and number of
employees) and profitability into consideration, we found significant differences, as can be
seen in Table 5.1 below. 
Table 5.1. Does your company have a formal management appraisal system?
Looking at the data by type of ownership, we find that 62% of multinational firms
have formal appraisal systems. More than 50% of State-owned and non-family firms have
them. Family firms are different; only 27% have formal systems. Again, family businesses











more than 10,000 59.0%
5,000-10,000 49.6%
less than 5,000 36.8%
more than 500 61.3%
200-500 49.0%
less than 200 39.2%




Number of employeesThere are also differences by type of structure. Only 34% of the companies with a
functional organization have formal appraisal systems, whereas in companies with more
complex and differentiated structures the figure is 60%.
As we have said before, there is a link between type of ownership and organizational
structure: family businesses are more likely to adopt a functional structure, while
multinational and non-family businesses are more likely to have a divisional or matrix
structure. Greater structural complexity requires a greater degree of systematization in the
guidance given to managers, or the use of integration mechanisms such as appraisal systems.
Size also plays a role in the adoption of formal appraisal systems. Close to 60% of
the companies in our sample with more than 500 employees or turnover above 10,000 million
pesetas have a formal system, while among those with a turnover under 5,000 million or
under 200 employees fewer than 40% have one.
Nevertheless, for all company sizes in our sample, the use of formal systems can be
considered as very low. Sometimes, specially in small companies, managers argue that formal
systems are not needed because they know each other and perform appraisals on a daily
basis. We believe this argument is mistaken.
First, a regular, written, formal system always affords greater protection against
arbitrariness and discrimination, which are more common in small organizations where there
are more power differences. Second, daily assessments are necessary but they are not enough;
the attention and concentration that a regular, written system requires complements daily
assessment and employee development. Finally, an informal system cannot provide the same
commitment and rigor as a written system.
There are several empirical works about the positive impact of performance
appraisals in improving a company's financial results, although none of them is absolutely
conclusive. The results of this study suggest that companies which use formal appraisal
systems are more profitable than those that do not (6.4% vs. 5.0%) (1). If we analyze by type
of ownership, we find that the differences are significant in State-owned and non-family
companies, while in family businesses and multinational firms the impact of the management
appraisal system is not significant.
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(1) p<0.05Table 5.2 Profitability comparison between companies 
with and without formal appraisal systems
One important aspect of the assessment process is deciding who should be included
in it. Latham and Wixley (1993) study characteristics, advantages and disadvantages of the
more common practices, as we discuss below.
The most common practice is appraisal by the immediate superior. This has some
advantages in hierarchical organizations because the superior is responsible for the subordinates'
development and compensation. As a consequence, he/she has the knowledge and motivation to
carry out the appraisal. However, experience shows that appraisals tend to be biased by the way
the superior would have done the job him/herself, or to be based just on results.
Other less standard practices are rapidly gaining in popularity in the US. One of them
is peer appraisal. This was still rare in the ’80s. Antonioni (1996) reports that 18% of US
companies now use peer information in their appraisals. And the proportion is higher among the
more advanced companies. Peer appraisal has many advantages. Peers tend to have better
information and knowledge to carry out the appraisal, as well as a clear vision of the task
performed by the appraised person. Furthermore, one can measure several parameters and
obtain a more reliable estimation. However, it is advisable that this appraisal be carried out at
the same time as the superior's appraisal, and it is very important that it be anonymous.
Another practice whose use is growing is subordinate appraisal. This kind of
appraisal has certain advantages in common with peer appraisal and is an important source of
feedback for management. Bernardin et al. (1993) indicate that subordinate appraisal is very
important in relation to the way a superior manages and relates to subordinates, but should
not include other managerial practices (such as budgeting or resource allocation), where
subordinates do not have the criteria to make a judgment.
Finally, we are currently seeing the emergence of integrative systems such as 360
degree appraisals, which include all of the above together with the self-assessment of the
appraised person. Usually, the superior uses all of this information to prepare the feedback
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TOTAL 6.4% 5.0%interview. Companies like ATT, Bank of America, GE, Caterpillar, Chrysler, and others, use
this system. An interview of 280 Mid-West companies revealed that 12% of them used 360˚
appraisal. Even in Spain, some companies –such as AGF-Unión y el Fénix or Campofrío– are
experimenting with it. Some researchers indicate that employees are reluctant to be appraised
in this way if promotion decisions are at stake. However, 90% of the companies using it use it
as a tool to decide wage increases, promotions and separations (Bohl, 1996).
Some procedural elements are very important. Information should be kept
anonymous; evaluators should be selected by objective criteria; written feedback is essential.
Antonioni (1996) reports that between 15% and 20% of managers get unexpected negative
feedback. Therefore, feedback and associated action plans are fundamental.
Actual practices in Spain are far less advanced. As Figure 5.1 shows, most
appraisals involve the immediate superior (79%) and, to a much lesser degree, the CEO
(49%). The role of the Human Resources Manager is secondary (24%). Only 12% of
companies use two superiors. Finally, subordinate appraisal is used in only 4% of cases, a
level corresponding to the last decade in the US. This seems to imply that we can expect to
see rapid growth in this area in the near future.
Figure 5.1 Participants in manager appraisal
Some of the data on processes are very interesting. Most (80%) of the companies that
carry out appraisals do so once a year, 16% twice a year, and 4% more frequently. However,
only 70% of the appraisals use formal documents and, more surprisingly, only 79% are
discussed with the appraisee. 3.7% are sent to the person with no discussion and 17.5% are kept
secret. One may wonder what the feedback effect of secret appraisals might be.
There is no doubt that appraisal systems have their critics (Ghorpade and Chen, 1995),
who highlight the limitations of these systems. However, appraisal systems are of great help in
managing managers and are an important governance tool. From our data, we can conclude that
Spanish practices have a lot of room for improvement. The larger, more complex, more highly
differentiated companies are the ones that are most likely to use formal systems and adopt more



























5% 4% 4% 4%Compensation (1) 
A very powerful governance mechanism is the way we compensate managers,
particularly the CEO (Gómez-Mejía, 1994). In this section, we propose to study relevant
aspects of Board behavior and the way they affect CEO compensation.
A recent survey by Towers Perrin in the US reported that 57% of management
compensation was associated with results, while in 1989 the figure was only 37% (Schmitt,
1996). Our Spanish data are very different. As Table 5.3 shows, the average variable
compensation is only 19% for the highest level managers, decreasing to 13% for managers at
the third level. These data reflect the low penetration of incentive pay in Spain.
Table 5.3 Percentage of fixed and variable compensation
However, we believe that it is useful to study the determinants of incentive pay, as
well as its association with corporate performance, using agency theory as a theoretical
framework (Holmstrom, 1979).
The Board of Directors, as the representative of the shareholders, who are the
owners, will be the "principal", and its goal will be to maximize its utility by maximizing the
company’s utility. The CEO will be the "agent"; his objective will be to maximize his utility
by maximizing his expected remuneration, and his task will consist of managing the company
in order to accomplish the shareholders’ objectives.
To achieve their goals, the shareholders (represented on the Board of Directors)
design a compensation and incentive system to align the CEO’s goals with their own. The
CEO's compensation will be made up of incentives based on his/her behavior, and incentives
based on the outcome of his/her behavior.
In the case of CEO behavior-based incentives, the CEO will receive a fixed salary
(Eisenhart, 1985, 1988) and, if appropriate, subjective variable incentives (Govindarajan and
Gupta, 1985; Fisher and Govindarajan, 1993; Bushman et al., 1996).
The other alternative is compensation based on company outcomes. In this case,
depending on the attainment of certain target indicators of company performance, the CEO
will receive an objective variable incentive (Fisher and Govindarajan, 1993; Munter and
Kren, 1995).
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(1) This section is based mostly on Corrales (1998).
Level I 81 % 19 %
Level II 83 % 17 %
Level III 87 % 13 %
p < 0.001
% fixed compensation % variable compensationIn practice, contracts are usually a combination of these types of incentives: fixed
salary, subjective variable salary and objective variable salary. The purpose of agency theory




The Board of Directors could be an efficient tool for supervising the CEO.
Improving the level of monitoring reduces the need for incentive pay and, therefore, reduces
the risk shared by the agent and the associated agency cost (Eisenhardt, 1989; Munter and
Kren, 1995). A greater number of outside directors will enable the Board to exercise closer
supervision, and will therefore lead to a greater proportion of compensation being based on
CEO behavior (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Beatty and Zajac, 1994). 
H1a. The proportion of outsiders on the Board is positively correlated with the
proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay.
Another way to assess the level of Board supervision is through the level of Board
activity in the company. The more active the Board, the greater its ability to assess the CEO's
behavior and, therefore, the greater the proportion of behavior-based incentive compensation
(Patton and Backer, 1987).
H1b. The Board's activity in governance decision-making is positively correlated
with the proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay.
2. Programmability
The "programmability" of a task could be defined as the extent to which the activity
a person carries out is predefined. The more operative the task to be done by the agent, the
more programmable it is. The fact that an activity is more programmable directly affects
the agent's monitorability, because it reduces the cost of information (Eisenhardt, 1985).
Compensation will therefore be more behavior-dependent.
One of the organizational characteristics that could influence the programmability of
the CEO's tasks is the type of activity the company is engaged in. Companies whose
decision-making processes are more definable a priori will enable a higher level of
programmability (Thompson, 1967; Fisher and Govindarajan, 1993). This is the case of
primary production and manufacturing companies.
H2a. The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay is higher in primary
production and manufacturing companies.
Another organizational characteristic that should be taken into account is the level of
decentralization or autonomy. According to Eisenhardt (1989), this variable affects a task's
programmability. Greater decentralization, generally associated with divisional and matrix
structures, is linked with a lower level of programmability in executive decisions.
32H2b. The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay is higher in companies
with a functional structure.
Another organizational characteristic that affects the programmability of the CEO's
tasks is company size. According to Eaton and Rosen (1983) and Holthausen and Larcker
(1991), greater company size is associated with an increase in the difficulty and cost of
monitoring. The larger the company, the more difficult it will be to obtain information to
evaluate the efficiency of the decisions taken by the CEO.
H2c. The size of a company is negatively correlated with the proportion of behavior-
based CEO incentive pay.
3. Ability to measure outcomes
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) highlight the difficulty in associating good
indicators with the behaviors we wish to induce. The agent will devote his efforts to tasks that
are easier to measure and associate with a particular incentive. We also have to be alert to the
CEO's ability to "manipulate" performance indicators.
Market ratios are usually considered better tools for evaluating CEO activity (Fama,
1980). Therefore, it will be easier to associate indicators with these measures.
H3. The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay will be smaller in listed
companies. 
4. Risk aversion
In a family business, one may assume that the principal is more risk averse than in
other types of business. This greater risk aversion should generate a tendency to compensate
the CEO with a larger proportion of outcome-based compensation.
H4. The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay will be smaller in family
companies.
5. Uncertainty about results
Other factors that the CEO cannot control could affect the company's results.
Uncertainty increases the risk premium of risk-averse agents and/or principals. Conversely,
decreases in uncertainty should allow principals to define objectives better and should
therefore be associated with a larger proportion of outcome-based compensation. State-
owned firms compete in regulated industries with lower competitive uncertainty (Ittner,
Larcker and Rajan, 1997). Therefore:
H5. The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay will be smaller in State-
owned companies.
336. Company performance
The basic agency theory assumption is that compensation contracts can be written to
give managers incentives to maximize the company's performance (Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1996). A large number of empirical studies have shown that CEO compensation
systems focus on achieving this goal (Larcker, 1983).
H6. Companies that have CEO incentive systems perform better.
Methodology
Dependent variables
Some previous studies (Gómez Mejía, Tosi and Hinkin, 1987; Tosi and Gómez
Mejía, 1989; Beatty and Zajac, 1994; Munter and Kren, 1995) use the ratio of fixed salary to
total salary as "The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay", while the ratio of
variable salary to total salary represents "The proportion of CEO incentive pay based on
outcomes".
Other authors (Ouchi, 1977; Fisher and Govindarajan, 1993; Bushman, Indjejikian
and Smith, 1996) try to differentiate, within the variable part, between a portion based on
subjective criteria (leadership abilities, human development, strategic ability, …) and a
portion established by objective criteria (economic indicators). According to these authors,
behavior-based compensation will be the sum of the fixed salary and the variable part
allocated using subjective criteria. The variable part determined using objective criteria
represents the outcome-based CEO incentive pay. In this study, we used both methods to
measure compensation.
In the first case, the dependent variable is fixed salary over total salary (FS/TS),
which represents the proportion of behavior-based CEO compensation. We have used the
natural logarithm of this variable, which we call log SF.
To calculate the dependent variable under the second assumption, we need to define
what portion of variable compensation is determined by subjective criteria and what portion
by objective criteria. To do this, we use a question from the questionnaire where we asked the
correspondent to rate, from most important to least important (1=most important, 5=least
important), the factors that determine variable compensation:
1. Company financial performance
2. Individual goal achievement
3. Position in organization chart
4. Personal ability
5. Employee development
We used these data to run a factorial analysis, obtaining two main factors, shown in
Figure 5.2. It is easy to see that the second factor can be associated with variable
compensation based on objective criteria, while the first factor corresponds to variable
compensation based on subjective criteria.
34Figure 5.2 Factor chart of objective and subjective criteria
Using these factors, for the second set of assumptions, we define the proportion of
behavior-based compensation as the sum of fixed salary and variable subjective salary, divided
by total salary ((FS+VSS)/TS). Again, we use the natural logarithm, called log SFVS.
Independent or explanatory variables
The model's independent variables are:
– Proportion of outside directors (OD)
– Size (Employees/100) (EMP)
and the following dummy variables:
– Activity of the Board of Directors (ACT)
– Primary production or manufacturing industry (PROD)
– Functional structure (FUN)
– Listed on the stock market (LIS)
– Family firm (FAM)
– State-owned firm (ST)
To study the last hypothesis, the company's performance has been measured using
two indicators: profit on sales (P/S) and profit per employee (P/E).
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Table 5.4 shows the correlation matrix of independent variables. There are no major
correlations between variables, which avoids co-linearity problems in the models:
Table 5.4. Correlation matrix of independent variables (n=374)
It is interesting to outline the most significant correlations. In particular, State-
owned companies are positively correlated with the proportion of outside directors, which is
reasonable, because in State-owned firms Board positions are political. On the other hand,
State-owned companies are negatively correlated with primary production activities and
manufacturing, which is also reasonable, as most State-owned firms are in public services,
transport and financing. Family businesses are negatively correlated with the proportion of
outsiders on the Board. There is also a correlation between family companies and primary
production activities and manufacturing, as well as with functional structure. Finally, there is
a positive correlation between listed companies and the number of employees, which shows
that listed companies tend to be larger.
Empirical results
We used multiple regression to test the first eight hypotheses. The following Table
shows the results of the first model. The independent variable is log FS (fixed salary), which
represents the proportion of behavior-based compensation.
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Variable ACT OD PROD FUN EMP LIS FAM ST
ACT 1
OD 0.12 1
PROD –0.10 –0.07 1
FUN 0.01 0.02 0.15 1
EMP –0.01 0.02 –0.02 –0.10 1
LIS 0.00 0.05 0.12 –0.12 0.24 1
FAM 0.03 –0.18 0.19 0.16 –0.06 –0.05 1
ST 0.00 0.25 –0.17 0.07 0.09 –0.03 -0.14 1Table 5.5 Results of the first model
The variable that measures the Board of Directors' activity shows a significant and
positive relationship (p<0.05). It confirms the positive relationship between the Board of
Directors' level of activity and behavior-based compensation foreseen in hypothesis 1b. We
cannot confirm hypothesis 1a (positive relationship between behavior-based compensation
and the proportion of outside directors). This relationship is not sustained by the model.
The positive relationship between behavior-based compensation and companies
specializing in primary production (PROD) is confirmed (p<0.001), thus sustaining
hypothesis 2a. The same is found for hypotheses 2b and 2c. Both the FUN and the company
size (number of employees -EMP-) variables are significant.
We cannot confirm hypotheses 3 and 5. In the former we conjectured a negative
relationship between the proportion of behavior-based compensation and listed companies
(LIS). In the latter we conjectured a negative relationship with State-owned companies (ST).
The relationship is not significant in either case.
Finally, there is a significant negative relationship (p<0.001) between the proportion
of behavior-based compensation and family business (FAM). With this result, hypothesis 4 is
confirmed.
Table 5.6 shows the results of running multiple regression for the second model. We
used log SFVS (fixed salary+subjective variable salary) as a dependent variable.
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Multiple linear regression
Companies which pay incentives
Dependent variable: log SF
F = 10,930 p = 0.000 R2 = 0.232
Variable Coefficient St. dev. Beta t value p
Ind. term 1.884 0.01 190.829 < 0.001
ACT 0.020 0.008 0.127 2.427 0.015
OD –0.001 0.000 –0.049 –0.895 0.371
PROD 0.031 0.009 0.196 3.605 < 0.001
FUN 0.015 0.009 0.091 1.690 0.091
EMP –0.002 0.000 –0.310 –5.748 < 0.001
LIS –0.012 0.013 –0.047 –0.868 0.386
FAM –0.065 0.010 –0.346 –6.346 < 0.001
ST 0.019 0.016 0.063 1.156 0.248Table 5.6. Results of the second model
Hypotheses 1b, 2a, 2b, 2c and 4 are confirmed again, strengthening our theoretical
model and giving more validity to the conclusions reached earlier.
Finally, hypothesis 6 conjectured better performance for companies that apply CEO
incentives, compared with those that do not. We ran a t-test for the difference in the averages
of the two indicators of financial performance, profit over sales (P/S) and profit per employee
(P/E). The following table shows the results of this analysis.
Table 5.7. Performance comparison between companies 
which apply incentives and those which do not
t-test (n= 465)
We can see that the average of P/E and P/S is larger in companies that apply




Companies which pay incentives
Dependent variable: log (SF+SVS)
F = 10,792 p = 0.000 R2 = 0.231
Variable Coefficient St. dev. Beta t value p
Ind. term 1.929 0.005 376.277 < 0.001
ACT 0.018 0.004 0.222 4.220 < 0.001
OD –0.0001 0.000 –0.054 –0.976 0.329
PROD 0.015 0.004 0.186 3.395 0.001
FUN 0.010 0.005 0.111 2.049 0.040
EMP –0.001 0.000 –0.290 –5.366 < 0.001
LIS –0.009 0.007 –0.069 –1.264 0.206
FAM –0.029 0.005 –0.306 –5.588 < 0.001
ST 0.008 0.009 0.048 0.884 0.377
Variable(1) With incentives (n=374) Without incentives (n=91)
Average Std. Dev. Average Std. Dev.
P / E (mill. ptas.) 3.39 9.52 0.83 6.30
P / S (%) 6.13 6.84 3.57 8.46
Average diff. p
P / E (mill. ptas.) 2.56 < 0.05
P / S (%) 2.56 < 0.05Discussion
Table 5.8 shows the conclusions of our analysis of the determinants of CEO
compensation. As in other parts of this paper, it is important to stress that while the number
of outsiders on the Board is not significant, the monitoring hypothesis holds true when we
use the Board's activity. Once again, composition is not a good indicator of governance
excellence (Dalton et al., 1998).
Table 5.8 Conclusions
Most of the basic hypotheses are confirmed. Board supervision and task
programmability have a positive correlation with the proportion of fixed pay, size and risk
aversion (family) a negative correlation.
The most interesting result is that, in spite of limited use, the use of incentives is
correlated with better performance. As a consequence, we can well advise Spanish Boards of
Directors to pay more attention to management compensation, to increase the proportion
of variable pay, and to design it according to prevailing theoretical recommendations, even if
these recommendations come from other contexts, as they are applicable to the case of Spain.
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Hypothesis Conclusion
H1a. The proportion of outsiders on the Board is positively
correlated with the proportion of behavior-based Not proven
CEO incentive pay.
Monitoring H1b.  The Board's activity in governance decision-making
is positively correlated with the proportion of behavior-based Proven
CEO incentive pay.
H2a.  The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay
is larger in primary production and manufacturing Proven
companies.
Programmability H2b.  The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay is Proven
larger in companies with a functional structure.
H2c.  A company's size is negatively correlated with the proportion Proven
of behavior-based CEO incentive pay.
Ability to measure  H3.  The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay is Not proven
outcomes smaller in listed companies.
Risk aversion H4.  The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay is Proven
smaller in family companies.
Uncertainty about H5. The proportion of behavior-based CEO incentive pay is
the results smaller in State-owned companies. Not proven
Company  H6.  Companies that have CEO incentive systems show
performance better performance. ProvenConclusions
This study is the first broad analysis of governance practices in Spain. Based on a
powerful sample, it is very representative of the situation at the end of 1996. It may not be so in
1998, though. All indications in the analysis of the data show that the country is rapidly
evolving and governance practices are changing and advancing. This is also confirmed by more
anecdotal data from the press, such as the recent Olivencia report on best Board practices or the
increasing use of incentive pay for top management compensation.
To summarize some of the implications of this paper:
1. Governance practices in Spain are far from effective. 42% of Boards are not active,
only about 15% are participative, and even active Boards meet infrequently, devote too much
time to reports, and do not get involved enough in the important issue of managing the top
management team.
2. Some data are particularly interesting. 20% of the companies do not have an
executive or management committee, concentrating executive power in the CEO or the Board
itself. Less than 50% of the companies carry out formal appraisals of their key managers. And
20% of those that do never discuss them with the person being appraised. Finally, incentive pay
is used in only a very small proportion of the companies. Surprising data, and even more so
considering that we have been able to show that the three practices –management committee,
appraisal, and incentive pay– are associated with improved corporate performance. Spanish
companies would be well advised to follow them.
3. We were not able to show a significant association between better Board practices
and corporate performance, but we believe this is merely a consequence of the novelty of the
changes.
4. More and more studies are coming to the conclusion that most composition,
characteristic or process variables are less relevant for effective governance than the actual will
of the CEO and Board members to make governance a reality and to differentiate between
governance and management, seeking a balanced distribution of power.
5. Governance practices in Spain are far from sophisticated, whether at Board level or,
in a very specific way, with regard to the fundamental task of managing managers. Significant
progress in appraisal and compensation systems is likely to take place within a short period of
time. Everything seems to indicate that we will end up adopting practices developed in other
cultural contexts such as the US, in spite of the institutional differences.
Spain was a closed economy for many years. Autarky made companies small and full
of inefficiencies. The opening of the economy has led to a business revolution in Spain. The
response has been striking. Business has rationalized and modernized, becoming increasingly
focused and globalized. The gain in productivity has been tremendous. Most of the
restructuring is complete. Now, companies must take the next step. And for this new stage,
driven by the aggressive pursuit of growth and opportunities, by innovation and creativity, it is
fundamental to develop the right governance practices.
The major surgery has been done. Now, it is necessary to advance in Board
revitalization, appraisal and feedback, sharing and incentives. This is the way forward and
Spain has a long way to go. But it is making progress.
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1.  Who answers the questionnaire:






3.  Total Sales in 1995 (in mill. of PTAs):
4.  Profits before taxes in 1995 (mill. PTAs):
5.  Number of employees in 1995:
6.  Type of ownership (mark one answer in each line):
a) Family Non Family
b) National Multinational
c) State-Owned Private
d) Listed on the stock market Not Listed on the stock market
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
1.  Type of Board in your company:
a) There is no Board c) Nominal (There is a Board, but it has little influence)
b) Legal  d)  Active
2.  Number of directors on the Board:
a) Inside  directors:
b) Outside  directors:
3. Who appoints new directors to the Board?





II. GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT BODIESAppendix 1 (continued)
4. Criteria applied in selecting new directors, from most important to least important
(1=most important, 5=least important):
a)  Personality and character: 1 2 3 4 5
b)  Position in organization chart: 1 2 3 4 5
c)  Experience, training and knowledge: 1 2 3 4 5
d) Trust: 1 2 3 4 5
e)  Other (please specify): 1 2 3 4 5
5.  How often (per year) does the Board meet?
6.  How long is each meeting of the Board?
a)  Half morning or half afternoon  c) One day
b)  One morning or one afternoon  d) Two days
7.  Do directors receive information before meetings?
a) YES
b) NO
8. What type of information do directors receive before each meeting?
a)  Agenda of meeting  d)  Information about important decisions
b)  Minutes of last meeting e)  Other (please specify):
c) Financial  situation
9. Percentage of time (approximate) devoted by the Board to the following activities:
% time spent in meetings
a)  Listening to reports:
b)  Approving strategic decisions:
c)  Approving statutory decisions:
d)  Approving ordinary decisions:
e)  Discussing critical issues:
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
10. Is there an Executive Committee in your company?
a) YES
b) NO
11. How many managers are there on the Committee?
12. Who appoints managers to the executive committee?




13.  Criteria applied in selecting managers, from most important to least important (1 = most
important, 5 = least important):
a)  Position in the organization chart 12345
b)  Candidate’s specific characteristics: 12345
c) CEO  trust: 12345
d) Training,  qualifications: 12345
e)  Seniority in company: 12345
f)  Other (please specify): 12345
14.  How often does the Committee meet?
a)  Once a week  d) Once every two months
b)  Once every two weeks e) Once every three months
c)  Once a month f)  Other (please specify):
15.  How long is each Committee meeting?
a)  Half a morning or half an afternoon
b)  One morning or one afternoon
c) One  day
16.  Do members of the Committee receive information before each meeting?
a) YES
b) NO
17.  What kind of information do Committee members receive before each meeting?
a)  Agenda of meeting f)  Labor background
b)  Minutes of last meeting g)  Shareholder relations
c)  Financial situation h)  Information about important decisions
d)  Degree of goal achievement i)  Other (please specify)
e)  Market information
48Appendix 1 (continued)
MANAGEMENT BODIES’ TASKS
18.  Complete the chart below to show the role of each management body in relation to the
activities listed:
A= Approve D= Decide




AD P I AD P I AD P I
1. Company strategy
2. Business line selection.
Mergers, acquisitions and divestments
3. Investment decisions.
Operating budget.
4. Structure and sources
of finance.
5. Auditing
6. Assessment of Top
Managers (appraisal)
7. Selection and separation
of Top Managers










14. Environmental analysisAppendix 1 (continued)








20.  How many management levels are there between CEO and operative staff?
a)  Six or more  e) Two
b) Five  f)  One
c) Four  g)  None
d) Three
21.  How long is it (in years) since the last change in the organizational structure of your
company?
22.  What factors influenced the decision to change the organizational structure?
a)  Growth / Contraction  e)  Changes in technologies
b)  Disposals / acquisitions, Mergers  f)  Changes in capital structure
c)  Improvement of service or quality  g)  Other factors (please specify)
d) Cost  reduction
APPRAISAL
23.  Does your company have a formal management appraisal system?
a) YES
b)  NO (In this case, go to Compensation section)
24.  For all managers other than the CEO, who participates in appraisals?
a)  Immediate superior  e)  Two or more superiors
b)  Human Resources Director  f)  CEO




IV. MANAGER APPRAISAL AND COMPENSATIONAppendix 1 (continued)
25.  Factors used in management appraisal
a)  General knowledge about management  j)  Attitude towards customers
b)  Specific knowledge about the task  k)  Attitude towards the firm
c)  Knowledge about sector  l)  Attitude towards colleagues
d)  Other knowledge  m)  Other attitudes
e)  Specific goals of the unit  n)  Company performance
f)  Specific goals of the business  o)  Unit performance
g)  Personal goals  p)  Deviation from budget
h)  Other goals  q)  Other results
i) Other  factors  r)  Other
26.  Points which best describe the characteristic of the formal appraisal process:
a) Formal  documents
b) Secret  appraisals
c)  Appraisals are sent to the appraisee without discussing them
d)  Appraisals are discussed with the appraisee
27.  How often are appraisals conducted?
a)  Once a year
b)  Every six months
c)  Every three months
28.  Purpose of the appraisal process (1 = most important, 5 = least important):
a)  Career design and staff improvement 
plan in the firm 1 2 3 4 5
b) Assigning  responsibilities 1 2 3 4 5
c) Fixing  compensation 1 2 3 4 5
d)  Other (please specify): 1 2 3 4 5
51Appendix 1 (continued)
COMPENSATION
29.  Please give the percentage of fixed and variable compensation (for the first three levels
of management)
Level Fixed Compensation Variable Compensation




30. Factors that influence fixed compensation  (1= most important, 5= least important):
a)  Position in organization chart 1 2 3 4 5
b) Goal  achievement 1 2 3 4 5
c) Potential  1 2 3 4 5
d)  Knowledge and competencies 1 2 3 4 5
e)  Style, age and seniority 1 2 3 4 5
f)  Other factors (please specify) 1 2 3 4 5
31. Factors that influence variable compensation (1= most important, 5= least important):
a) Company  performance 1 2 3 4 5
b)  Individual goal achievement 1 2 3 4 5
c)  Position in organization chart 1 2 3 4 5
d) Personal  ability 1 2 3 4 5
e) Subordinates  development 1 2 3 4 5
f)  Other (please specify) 1 2 3 4 5







e) Share  price
f) Market  share
g)  Economic Value Added (EVA)
h) Others
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